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D. L. d’Avray
Werner Menski
Authenticating Marriage: The Decree Tametsi
in a Comparative Global Perspective*
Global history takes two forms. The first is structured chronologically, the 
second comparatively. The focus of the (very broadly) chronological sort is 
on seminal developments and influences. Questions about how the West 
became more powerful and richer than the rest tend to dominate, but the 
approach also works for religious history, not least for the spread throughout 
the globe of Christianity as a world religion. Under this large rubric the 
history of the Council of Trent’s influence deserves a prominent position, 
for missionary work was almost a Catholic monopoly in the early modern 
period, and the effect of the Council of Trent’s decrees on the areas mis-
sionised, in general and with special reference to marriage, ought to be a 
major theme in the story. In fact the proportion of historical importance to 
research undertaken is higher for this topic than for most, and most of the 
contributions to this volume help to redress that.
It is also possible, however, to study the Council of Trent’s marriage 
decrees in the framework of the other sort of global history, that is to say, 
comparatively. By looking at responses of different societies to approximately 
the same problem, one can begin to discern patterns of similarity but also of 
specificity. It is the aim of the present essay to ask such questions.
The Council of Trent attempted to change a situation in which couples 
could get married validly without any formalities. Here we look at that 
attempt in the light of other societies that had to face the same problem: 
medieval Europe, which addressed it wholly ineffectually; modern Pakistan, 
which has still to overcome a conviction aired in the discussions before the 
Council of Trent’s decree Tametsi on marriage: viz., that positive law lacks 
the power to impose an extra condition for the validity of marriage; and 
* We would like to thank the following for of various kinds: Benedetta Albani, Bonnie 
Blackburn, Charles Donahue, Julian Hoppit, Daniela Lombardi, Lyndal Roper, Silvana 
Seidel Menchi.
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eighteenth-century England, which tried to solve the problem along lines 
somewhat similar to those laid down by the Council of Trent. It emerges 
forcibly that this was no easy problem to solve: that is common to all four 
cases. There is also a finding about the specificity of the Counter-Reforma-
tion solution. Difficult though the problems created unintentionally by 
Tametsi were, the creation of the Congregatio Concilii as the body with 
the task of implementing the Council’s non-dogmatic decrees provided a 
way of dealing with them. Administrative in character rather than legal in 
the ius commune sense, the Congregatio Concilii seems to have been rela-
tively nimble in responding to and resolving the problems that new legis-
lation invariably generates.
Under the aegis of Pope Innocent III, with the medieval papacy arguably 
at the peak of its power, in the context of across-the-board reforms, as then 
conceived, the Fourth Lateran Council of 12151 revolutionised marriage law 
in that it reduced the ‘forbidden degrees’ within which a valid marriage 
could not be contracted from seven (sixth cousin) to four (third cousin) 
and required that banns be read before marriages, in the hope that impedi-
ments would be revealed before the knot was tied.2 What Lateran IV did not 
do was make the prior reading of the banns, or any form of public ceremony 
or registration, a condition for a marriage to be actually valid – banns were 
required but breaking that rule would not be a ground for annulment. It le 
the rule established in preceding decades that free consent was sufficient to 
make a marriage valid,3 and the consequences unfolded over the next cen-
turies. Until the Counter-Reformation a couple could validly get married 
entirely on their own – without priest, magistrate, or even witnesses – in 
Catholic Europe: Church authorities did not like it but they recognised the 
faits accomplis. Granted that Lateran IV changed so much, it is good to think 
about the major negative fact that the thirteenth-century council missed 
what might seem to the modern observer an excellent opportunity to antici-
pate the Council of Trent’s ruling on marriage in church: for it is well 
known that in the sixteenth century the Council of Trent made a church 
ceremony a sine qua non for a valid marriage between Catholics (decree 
1 For general background on this council, see e. g. F (1965).
2 Fourth Lateran Council decrees 50, 51, 52; T (1990) 257–259; B (1970) 
332–337.
3 ’A (2008) 125–127.
2 D. L. d’Avray, Werner Menski
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754003
Tametsi).4 The later medieval marriage law’s unwilling acceptance of unau-
thenticated marriages is the point of contrast with three comparanda: mod-
ern Pakistan, eighteenth-century England, and Tridentine Catholicism, all of 
which faced the same problem and tried to fix it by making formal authen-
tication procedures a sine qua non for a valid marriage.
The first part of this essay explores the consequences of the medieval 
Church’s inaction, but we then go to ask what the alternatives were. Only 
comparative analyses can make this relatively concrete. They all show how 
hard it was to move from the assumption that divine law alone determined 
what made a marriage to the regulation of validity by positive human law – 
without breaking the link with the religious system, as modern Western 
states do. Comparison and contrast with modern Pakistan suggests that 
the Western Church was better placed to legitimate such a change at least 
with the religious elite, but also that religious assumptions about the mini-
mum required to make a valid marriage would not have been easy to alter, 
granted a widespread assumption that unofficial contracts were valid in the 
eyes of God. Eighteenth-century England suggests that even an apparently 
well-craed law could create entirely unforeseen problems: thus, even if the 
Fourth Lateran Council had passed such a law, they would have faced a host 
of unforseen problems. The aermath of the Council of Trent also makes the 
same point, which is brought home by soundings in a little-known fondo of 
the Congregation set up to implement Tridentine decrees. The same sound-
ings also show a method of resolving them quite different from that of 
classical medieval canon law, and raise the question of whether this wider 
range of changes was even conceivable in the thirteenth century.
The comparative method used here is combined with a certain sort of 
counterfactual analysis. It is a different sort from speculations about what 
would have happened if Napoleon had won the battle of Waterloo, and 
equally far from the attempts at counterfactual quantification of the “New 
Economic History” that was in vogue especially in the 1960s and 1970s. It is 
closer to the approach of Geoffrey Hawthorn,5 whose method deserves more 
sustained attention from historians. Hawthorn’s method was to ask whether 
4 Council of Trent, Sessio 24, De Matrimonio, Canones super reformatione circa matrimo-
nium, in: A (1972) 755–757. For context see J (1975), ch. 5 passim, and 
156–158, 160–162, and L (2008) 100–105.
5 See above all H (1991), making a formidable case for counterfactual history.
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a given counterfactual scenario was within the range of plausible possibility 
at a given time. Did people making decisions at the time have enough room 
for manoeuvre to bring about this other outcome ? He argues, for instance, 
that the Black Death was unstoppable by human agency when it first hit 
Europe in 1348. A couple of generations later, however, people knew that a 
really ruthless cordon sanitaire could keep it away from a given city or 
region. There was an alternative, though it required harsh decisions. Where 
a regime was in place capable of enforcing such decisions, but did not do so, 
a different outcome, escape from the plague, is a plausible counterfactual. 
The objection to some counterfactual statements, that they do not answer 
historical questions, need not hold with Hawthorn’s methodology or with 
the variant of it employed here. We offer modal statements about the past in 
answer to modal historical questions,6 defining modal as ‘involving the affir-
mation or negation of possibility, impossibility, necessity, or contingency’ (to 
quote the Oxford English Dictionary).
The variant of Hawthorn’s approach adopted here is to explore the range 
of other plausible outcomes with the help of the comparative method, by 
investigating the ways in which three societies tried to confront and sur-
mount the problem that the Western Church failed to face in 1215, at the 
Fourth Lateran Council. The concrete comparisons make it easier to envisage 
the other paths that were not taken in 1215. An essential basis for the 
comparison is a common starting point in all four cases: comparison has 
to be carefully framed to match like with like. In all the cases studied, 
marriage is regarded as a religious institution, and the legislative body – a 
great medieval Church Council, an Islamic State, the eighteenth-century 
Crown in Parliament, and an early modern Church Council – treats this 
institution as within its purview.
The comparisons show us that the alternative to tolerating one set of 
problems was to generate a different set, which we can characterise with 
some specificity. The comparanda adopted here do not exhaust all the possible 
ways of attempting to deal with the problem facing the medieval church, but 
they do bring out in their different ways how elusive the solution to the 
problem was, unless – and it is the final comparison that brings this out – 
change in marriage law had been accompanied by fundamental changes in 
the Church’s decision-making system.
6 Cf. B (1999) 145–168.
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In the centuries between the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 and the 
Council of Trent (1545–63) the marriage system of the medieval Church 
achieved in some respects a high degree of rationality, if we define the term 
to mean internal consistency governed by general principles. The internal 
contradiction by which the rules about consanguinity and affinity were used 
to undermine the principle of indissolubility had been more or less 
resolved.7 A positive law of marriage – that is, a man-made law designed 
to implement divine principles, but not coterminous with them – was 
included in the easily accessible corpus of Canon Law (the law of the medi-
eval Church), and a network of courts all over Europe was staffed by men 
who knew enough to apply it.8 Papal justice could reach all over Europe 
through a system of judges delegate,9 and could be meticulous about the 
formal rules of procedural law.10
On the particular point that concerns us, however, the social outcomes of 
the system were highly irrational, in the sense that they were chaotic and 
contrary to the intentions of those who had made and who administered the 
law. It was oen hard to be sure whether or not a couple had been married, 
if the alleged consent had been exchanged in informal circumstances and if 
one partner had subsequently married someone else. The Church deeply 
disapproved of clandestine marriages and in some regions at least the spiri-
tual penalties for them were severe, but these contracts were recognized as 
true marriages rather as a mass said by a priest in mortal sin was recognized 
as valid.
Marriage customs varied widely across Europe, and in parts of Italy, for 
instance, it was quite normal to get married without a priest or religious 
ceremony: this did not necessarily imply any disrespect for the Church, since 
the Fourth Lateran Council made no regulations at all about a church 
7 ’A (2008) 112–121.
8 For a sample of the vast bibliography on the ecclesiastical law of marriage in theory and 
practice see ., ch. 2 passim, adding notably L (2008); G (1980) 49–83 
(a good short survey of a body of cases from southern Champagne, on which see now 
MD (2012); D (2005); S (2008); C (2010); S 
M / Q (2006); R / W (2007); D (2007) and L
(2008), ch. 1. For canon law in general H (1996) is particularly good.
9 See e. g. H (1967), ch. 2, “Der Papst als Richter”; S (1971) and H
(2002) 20–43.
10 ’A (2005) 987–1013, at 993–994.
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ceremony,11 as opposed to banns before marriage. It should be said, how-
ever, that even the rule about the banns seems to have been ignored in some 
regions, not only by disobedient lay couples, of which more below, but also 
apparently without the local ecclesiastical authorities making an issue of it.12
Quite apart from legitimate local custom where the actual ceremony was 
concerned, and even apart from the failure of some regional churches to 
enforce the Lateran IV rule about banns, the situation was almost out of 
control, due precisely to this lack of any system for officially authenticating 
marriages. Without the help of such a system, the ecclesiastical courts that 
had come to maturity in the twelh and thirteenth centuries constantly had 
to decide whether or not a marriage was valid. The consequence was a mass 
of tricky litigation in the ecclesiastical courts. Cases about alleged prior 
contracts were extremely common in the church courts of the later Middle 
Ages and have been well studied by historians – notably by Richard Helm-
11 ’A (1998) 107–115. (On marriage in later medieval Italy see also K-Z
(1979) 1216–1243.) We find a remarkable heterogeneity even of permitted ways of enter-
ing marriage, with different regions following different rules. Cf. D (2005) 59; 
“entwickelte die kanonistische Lehre keine rechtlich verbindliche, die sakramentale Ehe 
auschließlich begründende Eheschließungsform. Hieraus ergab sich die Notwendigkeit 
entsprechender Ergänzungen durch partikularrechtliche Regelungen oder durch die Inte-
gration säkularer zeremonieller Handlungen – etwa beim Abschluß einer ‘rechten Ehe’.”
12 Significant remark in an apparently unstudied formulary of the Apostolic penitentiary: 
“CCCLXXXXI […] ipsi olim ignorantes quod aliqua esset consanguinitas inter eos que 
posset matrimonium impedire publice in facie ecclesie bannis ut moris est in partibus ipsis
premissis […]” (British Library [hereaer BL] Add. MS 24057, fol. 45r). The passage I have 
italicised implies that reading the banns was not a universal practice but a local custom – 
not what one might expect from a rule instituted by a general council. (This formulary 
has material that must be later than the formulary edited by L (1892), but has fewer 
entries than, and probably antedates, the formulary of Benedict XII analysed by G
(1907) 32–33.) Conversely, a later source shows it was not everywhere customary to have 
the banns read: “[…] ipsi olim ignorantes aliquod impedimentum inter eos existere, quo-
minus possent invicem matrimonialiter copulari, matrimonium inter se per verba, legit-
ime, de presenti § iuxta morem patrie ban<n>is non editis, cum in partibus illis banna 
e[d]di non consueverunt, servatis tamen sol<l>empnitatibus nubi servari consuetis § in-
vicem contraxerunt publice […]” (M (1979) number 826, 460). Cf. also the following 
passage from the Penitentiary Registers: “alias matrimonium inter se nulla proclamatione 
bannorum in parrochiali ecclesia, ut mos in illis partibus est, facta, et forsan clandestine 
per verba de presenti, alias tamen rite, contraxerunt” (Archivio Segreto Vaticano [hereaer 
ASV], Penitenzieria Apostolica 60, fol. 181v, cited in ’A (2005) 989, n. 6).
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holz (the pathbreaking pioneer),13 Frederik Pedersen14 and by Charles 
Donahue in a recent monumental study of five courts.15 For the law was 
open to abuse. At the cost of some perjury, the law that all marriages, even 
clandestine ones, were unbreakable could be turned into a way of breaking a 
marriage, by the type of suit known as the “marriage and divorce case”, causa 
matrimonialis et divorcii.16 The husband or wife who wanted to get out of a 
marriage to marry a third party could invent a story of a clandestine mar-
riage to the third party, one which allegedly took place before the marriage 
that he or she was attempting to get annulled. If witnesses could be induced 
by friendship or cash to swear to a plausible story, the court might be 
convinced and declare the existing marriage to be null. Obviously this could 
only work if the age of the third party did not rule it out: a man who had 
been married for twenty years could not claim that he had married a twenty-
year-old girl before that!
It must have been possible to abuse the system in a different way: by using 
it for purposes of seduction. Helmholz discusses a case that came before 
Innocent III, in which a man “contracted marriage under a fictitious name 
in order to extort sexual intercourse from a girl”.17 Innocent decided that the 
marriage was invalid if the man simply used the contract as a trick without 
any internal intention of making it a marriage. On the other hand, a con-
sensus developed that church courts should uphold such marriages:18 the 
ecclesiastical court could only annul a marriage on the basis of proof. A 
man’s declaration that he had not meant what he had said could not be 
grounds for an annulment. On the other hand, a marriage’s existence or 
non-existence was an objective fact which the court’s judgement could not 
affect.
13 H (1974).
14 P (2000). 
15 D (2007).
16 “The causa matrimonialis et divorcii could be used as a weapon of fraud, as a tool for 
dissolving long-standing marriages unjustly” (H (1974) 64). He tells the story of 
an unhappy marriage dissolved aer a third party had been bribed to swear that he had 
contracted a prior marriage with the wife: ., 162. A somewhat similar case is the 
subject of a vivid preaching exemplum: see ’A (2008) 119–120.
17 H (1974) 42.
18 I. 42–43.
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The situation could easily arise where the church court upheld a marriage 
which one party knew to be invalid. If the person in question had married 
someone else with real consent aer the marriage based on feigned consent 
the situation was worse. The other partner to the marriage which had been 
upheld by the court could demand restitution of conjugal rights, but to 
comply would be to commit adultery.19 Or again: Helmholz mentions the 
case of a man called John Paynaminuta living in London whose first wife 
was seen alive in Bayeux. Even if he wanted to leave the second wife, to do so 
legally he had to somehow prove to a church court that it really was his first 
wife in Bayeux, which might be hard.20
The further rule that betrothal followed by sexual intercourse counted as 
evidence for consent to a marriage must also have been a potential source of 
ambiguity; and it could have generated situations similar to those outlined 
above. The intercourse did not actually constitute consent: it was merely 
thought normally to be overwhelming evidence of consent when preceded 
by an engagement. As Aquinas puts it:
[…] we can speak in two ways about marriage. In one way with respect to the forum 
of conscience; and in this way the truth of the matter is that carnal union does not 
have the power to perfect a marriage which has been preceded by an engagement in 
words of the future tense, if mental consent is lacking; since even words in the 
present tense expressing consent do not make a marriage if mental consent is lack-
ing […]. In another way with respect to the judgement of the Church: and since in 
an external judgement, judgement is passed according to what can be seen from the 
outside, carnal union following betrothal is judged to make a marriage according to 
the judgement of the Church unless some explicit signs of trickery or fraud are 
apparent.21
A little later he specifies “signs […] such as if they are far apart in status, 
either with respect to nobility, or to fortune”. These comments evoke Tess of 
the d’Urbervilles-like scenarios – seduction of simple girls by cynical upper-
class men. There was not a lot to be done about them unless the law was 
modified.
The law did not work in a uniform way all over Europe: in fact there was 
much variety. In the bishopric of Regensburg, for instance, there was a much 
19 Cf. . 62–63.
20 I. 62.
21 In 4 Sententiarum Dist. 28 q. 1 art. 2, “Respondeo” section, in T ’A (2001) 
292.
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more tolerant attitude to informal marriages than, say, in Salisbury.22 The 
magisterial study of marriage litigation by Charles Donahue brings out some 
striking regional differences between England, Paris, and Belgium, the areas 
he studied.23 His arguments are too substantial for précis here but the 
following schema may be risked: the more that family interests controlled 
marriage at point of entry, the smaller the room le for exploiting the 
openings le by canon law. The converse is to be expected where the 
extended family was relatively weak and social attitudes relatively “individ-
ualistic”: the easier it was to get married without prior public knowledge, the 
higher the risk that one partner might deny that the marriage had ever taken 
place and get away with it, and the greater the temptation to escape from a 
marriage by pleading a previous contract and demonstrating it to a court 
through friends prepared to perjure themselves. On this model, parental or 
extended family control, on the one hand, and individualistic anarchy, on 
the other, varied inversely.
For all the regional variety, the absence of an official authentication sys-
tem was a problem common to the whole Latin West. Family structures 
might vary; local church authorities might be laissez-faire and lenient, or 
tough and prescriptive; the fact remains that a couple who had reached 
puberty and who were not too closely related could get married at any time 
and place by exchanging words of free consent. This was not likely to please 
parents any more than it did the authorities, and in due course there was a 
powerful reaction against it.
In the sixteenth century, forces as different as the French monarchy and 
Martin Luther wanted parental control to be enforced by law. If Sarah 
Hanley is right, mid-sixteenth-century French juries were asserting the right 
not only to punish marriages contracted without parental consent but also 
actually to annul them, a very different matter.24 A French royal edict of 
1556 “forbade young men under the age of thirty and young women under 
twenty-five to marry without obtaining the consent of their parents or rel-
atives”, with severe penalties for disobedience: loss of inheritance and other 
22 Contrast Statutes of Salisbury IV (1257) [24], in: P / C (1964) 559 with 
D (2005) 317: “Evoziert wurde […] Konfliktlösung.”
23 The following lines try to give a nutshell synthesis of some of the principle arguments of a 
study too massive and rich for me to do it justice.
24 H (2003) 1–40, at 7: “subject to nullification”; “nullified a clandestine marriage”.
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property rights (e. g. gis might be taken back),25 and “peines arbitraires”.26
The Edict of Blois laid down that to marry someone under twenty-five 
against their family’s wishes was rape and punishable by death; the consent 
of the “minor” did not alter the case.27
To make parental consent a necessary condition for a valid marriage was 
one answer to the problem. To go along with this idea the Church would 
have had to reverse a long tradition of emphasis on individual choice, espe-
cially strong from the twelh century on.28 At Trent, the Council Fathers 
were not prepared to do so, despite strong pressure from the French king to 
make parental consent a condition for a marriage of minors (“filii et filiae 
familias”).29
Luther seems to have thought that lack of parental consent invalidated a 
marriage, and came to the view that even subsequent parental consent did 
not make it a real marriage.30 A partial concession to the medieval canonists’ 
point of view was his belief that subsequent consummation created a valid 
marriage.31 His position is complicated by his use of the word “Verlöbnis”, 
which one would normally translate as “betrothal”. Does he mean a promise 
to marry in the future, or present consent ? The solution appears to be that 
he collapsed the distinction between betrothal and marriage so that all 
betrothals were marriages unless the contract was explicitly subject to a 
condition or a time limit.32 Luther’s marriage doctrine does not lend itself 
25 T (1980) 33.
26 G (1974) 15–30, at 18.
27 T (1980) 34.
28 N (1973), 419–434; D (1976) 251–279; B (1987) 335–336; ’A
(2008) 125–126; for the early Middle Ages see W (2001): she argues that consent did 
not mean just the consent of the couple.
29 J (1975) iv / 2. 105; L (2008) 100.
30 D (1970) 58: “verstei sich Luther darauf, daß die Nichtigkeit infolge fehlenden 
Elternkonsenses auch nicht durch nachträgliche Genehmigung seitens der Eltern geheilt 
werden könne”, citing his remark, in a sermon, to the effect that “Will also verdampt 
haben nicht allein das heimlich Verlöbnis der Kinder, sondern auch der Eltern Bewilli-
gung, so hernach allererst folget” (. 58 n. 232).
31 I. 58: “An dieser Heilung des Mangels der Heimlichkeit durch nachfolgenden fleischli-
chen Vollzug wird deutlich, daß Luther sich in Wahrheit gar nicht so weit vom kanoni-
schen Recht entfernt, wie es zunächst scheinen möchte.”
32 “[…] Sponsalia per verba de futuro (Verlöbnisse im engeren Sinne) will er nur dort 
annehmen, wo der Vertrag ausdrücklich bedingt oder betagt wird. Alle übrigen Despon-
sationen sollen sponsalia de praesenti, also eigentliche Eheschließung sein” (., 54). 
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to simple summary.33 His views are, however, certainly symptomatic of a 
widespread sense that marriage by consent alone was not working
The actual solutions worked out in Protestant Germany must be le to 
one side here. It is hard to generalise about a country with many different 
regimes, and more research is needed to put together an overall interpreta-
tion.34 In any case three comparanda are enough. In each of the cases chosen, 
the problem facing the authorities was practically the same as with the 
medieval Church, but they chose action rather than inaction and in different 
ways show the range and limits of what the medieval Church could have 
done about the problem.
All three systems to be compared with that of the late medieval church 
attempted a rationalisation35 of entry into marriage through the imposition 
of a clear-cut system under public control. The fact that the public control is 
L (2008) 107, formulates it a little ambiguously: ‘Lutero considerò la promessa 
come un vero e proprio matrimonio, a patto che venisse fatta pubblicamente, alla pre-
senza di almeno due testimoni e con il consenso dei genitori, e fosse solennizata in chiesa 
[…]”: this does not quite spell out whether the couple were already deemed to be married 
aer the “Verlöbnis” and before the ceremony, though Lombardi goes on to say, ibid., that 
“anche in area protestante la tendenza ad attribuire maggiore importanza alla cerimonia 
religiosa alla presenza del pastore fece sì che molto lentamente, tra il XVII e il XVIII 
secolo, promessa e matrimonio cominciassero a distinguersi”. On subject the following 
full analysis has still not been superseded: F (1865) 304–305 (summarizing a 
lengthy preceding discussion); cf. also F (1876) 64–70.
33 I. 58–59, passage beginning “Sein Standpunkt läß sich mit den Begriffen der Kanonis-
tik folgendermaßen umschreiben […]” and ending “[…] eine Einbruchsmöglichkeit eröff-
net wird”. In the last three medieval centuries a marriage by present consent (clandestine 
or not) was a “matrimonium ratum”, between “initiatum” and “consummatum”. A “ma-
trimonium initiatum” was nothing but a betrothal, to be taken more or less seriously 
according to the local custom, but certainly never indissoluble. I doubt whether Dieterich 
thinks he is talking simply about betrothals, however, since he speaks of clandestine 
marriages almost in the same breath.
34 On marriage law in Protestant Germany see F (2007) 372–392; B (1999); 
H (1995); R (1989); W (1986) 293–351; R (1985) 62–101 (note 
good bibliography on p. 64, n. 9 and p. 66, n. 12); S (1984); O (1983); 
D (1970) (not replaced for the new Protestant law of marriage); M 
(1968) 43–62. F (1876) is still worth reading; R (1967); W (2002), 
199–256.
35 It should be emphasised here that talk of rationalisation need not imply a value judge-
ment. The word is used in its Weberian sense, which was a neutral sense. There is a point 
of view from which any public control of private sexual lives seems unjustified, and it 
would be possible to hold that view without dissenting from the conclusions of this essay.
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that of the State in two cases and the Catholic Church in the other two 
makes surprisingly little difference: neither modern Pakistan nor eighteenth-
century England recognized a ‘Church – State’ or even a ‘Religious – Secu-
lar’ distinction such as non-academic Westerners believe to be universal, and 
the medieval and early modern Church acted as ‘the government’ where the 
validity of marriage was concerned, getting its claims fairly generally accep-
ted in Catholic Europe, moreover, with the notable exception, to be dis-
cussed below, of France.
So in each of these three cases – modern Pakistan, eighteenth-century 
England, Counter-Reformation Catholicism – a body claiming religious 
authority within the system in question tried to put an end to the chaos 
arising from religious recognition of informal marriages by requiring official 
authentication as a condition of validity. In each case the authority worked 
within the religious system rather than against it: so we are not looking at 
anything like a ‘Church v. State’ or ‘Religious – Secular’ conflict. In each case 
the solution brought its own problems, though in one case a mechanism was 
devised for solving them relatively smoothly. We will begin at a distance and 
in the present, with modern Pakistan; come closer to medieval Europe 
chronologically and geographically by looking at the abolition of clandestine 
marriages in eighteenth-century England; and end back in sixteenth-century 
Catholic Church, with the Council of Trent’s solution to the problem of 
unauthorised marriages.
Modern Pakistan is an Islamic state36 which has found itself facing diffi-
culties of much the same sort as troubled the later medieval Church: it was 
and is difficult to tell who is married and who is not. Marriages unauthenti-
cated by any official body were of unquestioned validity in religious terms – 
provided one could tell who was married to whom. To introduce some order, 
a body claiming supreme authority within a system of sacred law, as well as 
over State law, which is officially integrated into the sacred law, has pur-
ported to declare that unregistered marriages are invalid. Against this, many 
people doubt whether a marriage can be invalidated if it fulfils the essential 
requirements of the Sharia’h law. Pakistan has taken the course that the 
Fourth Lateran Council implicitly rejected but which, as we shall see, the 
Council of Trent adopted. The fact that we are dealing with Islamic rather 
36 For another Islamic case study, see C / Y / H (1996) 45–73. 
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than Christian sacred law does not invalidate the comparison: it works at all 
the essential points.
Can a Muslim state make Muslim laws and put itself above God’s law? 
Pakistan is the one jurisdiction in the world which has had to determine 
such questions within a postcolonial legal framework of reference. It 
becomes a matter of defining the identity of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
how questions of marriage, divorce and other matters are decided by state 
courts. When Pakistan became independent in 1947 it aimed to provide a 
homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims. A national Convention decided 
already in 1949 that the basic principles of Pakistani law should be those of 
Islam. This set up a tricky predicament for Pakistani state courts: the judges 
have to do the job of traditional Muslim jurists.
In 1961 the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) was promulgated.37
This is what section 5 says about the contract of marriage:
5. Registration of marriages:
(1) Every marriage solemnized under Muslim Law shall be registered in accordance 
with the provisions of this Ordinance.
What does this mean in practice and in law? The MFLO evidently recognizes 
that a Muslim marriage will be celebrated first of all under Muslim law, as a 
solemn contract before Allah. The Muslim state of Pakistan could not pos-
sibly have disregarded this. But what is the relationship between the tradi-
tional Muslim family law, the shariat, and the state-made rule of law that 
says that such a marriage shall be registered under the legal provisions made 
by the state? When does a Muslim marriage in Pakistan become legally valid 
– on completion of the Muslim contract, or on registration of the marriage 
in accordance with state law? This means we are asking whether the state’s 
law or God’s law is superior.
If we read the provision again, it seems to give us an answer: section 5 (1) 
avoids the word “contracted” for marriage, but uses “solemnized”, which 
seems to suggest that a religious marriage will only be legally valid under 
Pakistani law if it is duly registered with the state authorities. This impression 
is also reinforced by the use of the little word “shall” for the requirement to 
register.
37 Cf. e. g. M (2006) 372 and n. 159; it is an ordinance not an act because a military 
dictator promulgated it: . 372.
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Does it mean that a Muslim marriage contract in Pakistan will only be 
legally valid if that contract is ratified by the state? By no means! There is not 
a single case from Pakistan that would tell you that an unregistered Muslim 
marriage is not legally valid.38 The MFLO has always been challenged by 
Muslim fundamentalists in Pakistan as an un-Islamic law, and in 2000, the 
Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan finally tried to resolve the many challenges 
to the MFLO. It undertook a national reconciliation exercise, as the Court 
went to all major cities in the country, inviting anyone with any views to 
come and tell them, so that the matter could be decided in the public 
interest, helping to construct a proper Islamic system of governance in 
Pakistan.
The case of Allah Rakha v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2000 FSC 1, there-
fore became candid proof that Pakistan has two types of Islamic law and 
that, if it comes to the crunch, Islamic natural law is superior to Islamic 
positivist law.39 The case concerns succession of orphaned grandchildren, 
marriage, bigamy, and divorce. We are only looking here at the marriage 
aspects, sufficient to give the essential picture. The Federal Shariat Court was 
told by certain petitioners that the requirement in s. 5 MFLO to register 
Muslim marriages under Pakistani law was un-Islamic and violated the 
Qur’an and Sunna. With considerable subtlety, the Court managed to hide 
the key question at issue here – is a traditional Muslim marriage contract 
entered into in Pakistan legally valid by itself, or does it need the sanction of 
the state? It is a clear question: cannot the Court give a clear answer? Section 
5 (1) seems to suggest that a marriage must be registered, but we have 
already seen that if we read “shall” as “must”, we are privileging state law 
over shariat law, and that would indeed be un-Islamic. The Federal Shariat 
Court gets out of this: they find that there is nothing in Qur’an and Sunna to 
say that a marriage should not be registered. So a legal requirement to 
register a marriage would not in itself be un-Islamic, and in fact the Sunna 
recommends that important transactions should be documented in writing.
That line of reasoning does not, however, solve the issue of when a 
Muslim marriage contract becomes legally binding. In fact, where there is 
a conflict between the state-sanctioned shariat law and the state-made 
MFLO, the rules of the shariat will always prevail. Thus, “shall” in the MFLO 
38 The attitude of the British Home Office, deciding immigration cases, is another matter.
39 Cf. M (2006) 378. 
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nowhere means “must”, but rather something like “should”, or “should 
please”, or maybe “Inshallah, if God wills”. The result is that the so-called 
legal requirement to register a Muslim marriage in Pakistan under the pro-
visions of the MFLO is in fact optional. As in the early days of Islam, a 
modern Islamic state is also today not in a position to override God’s law. 
If the simple rule of contract of marriage in Islamic law is that a man and a 
woman may contract a marriage in front of God and at least two witnesses, 
then no Islamic state can deny that contract legal validity on the ground that 
it does not comply with some formalism of state law. Thus in Pakistan, we 
have a soi-disant Islamic government laying down an extra condition for a 
valid marriage, but failing to carry weight with the learned men who mat-
tered and the general population.
Is this what would have happened if the Fourth Lateran Council had tried 
to make some kind of registration of marriage a requirement for validity? 
The question forces us to think about authority structures in the two reli-
gions but also about the relation between those structures and popular feel-
ing. On the one hand, it seems likely that the requirement could have been 
legitimated in the eyes of the religious elite in thirteenth-century Western 
Europe. On the other hand, it is not so clear that the elite could have carried 
popular feeling with them.
The religious elite would probably have accepted that a General Council 
had the power to impose a new condition for validity, because there were 
precedents. The second Lateran Council (1139) had declared that a priest 
could not get married validly.40 Furthermore, the changing of the bounda-
ries of the forbidden degrees at Lateran IV implied that impediments to a 
valid marriage existing up until that point had been positive, i. e. human 
law, which the Church had made and could unmake. Subsequent dispensa-
tion practice presupposed that the impediments removed were those that the 
Church itself had created – and these were impediments that invalidated a 
marriage.41 Logically and theologically, no insuperable theological obstacle 
stood in the way, if the will had been there. If the Fourth Lateran Council 
had decreed (say) that no marriage was valid unless registered by the parish 
priest or a notary, it seems likely that the Council’s own authority would 
have given the decision more authority than the Pakistani State’s law seems 
40 M (1934) no. 307, 163.
41 See e. g. K (1937). For background, B (1925).
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to have had. However Islamic it may claim to be, the Pakistani State does not 
possess within Islam (even within the borders of Pakistan) the kind of 
authority that a General Council possesses within Catholic Christianity.
Whether the population of Christendom would have understood the 
logic is another matter. We have seen that there were regions of Europe 
where the clergy were not even involved in the marriage ceremony – where 
such involvement had not even been required by the Church so far as the 
actual ceremony was concerned. It is doubtful whether the time was ripe to 
win acceptance for so drastic a change.
When the change was finally made in the sixteenth century by the Coun-
cil of Trent the atmosphere was different. By that time, the clerical elite 
could at least draw support from the patriarchal reaction to the “consent 
makes a marriage” anarchy of the later medieval centuries. While the Coun-
cil Fathers parted company from the French monarchy and Martin Luther, 
among many others, when it came to parental consent, they could at least 
agree with both about the danger of clandestine marriages. In the thirteenth 
century that patriarchal backing might have been lacking. The power that 
the consent doctrine gave to couples had not yet had time to penetrate the 
general consciousness and subvert family authority. The legitimation by the 
highest Church authority of the doctrine that consent between a couple 
made a marriage, and the enforcement of that doctrine through a network 
of Church courts, was still relatively new.42 Potentially it put power in the 
hands of young people to defy their parents’ wishes. A general consciousness 
of that power would have taken time to take hold. It had well and truly done 
so by the sixteenth century, and as we have seen this had provoked a reaction. 
The reaction surely soened public opinion and made it ready for marriage 
reform by the Church. Heads of households in particular must by then have 
been acutely aware of the advantages of eliminating informal entry into 
marriage. Parental control would be best of all but proper procedures with 
a religious ceremony were a lot better than nothing: there would be every 
opportunity to counter romantic plans. In 1215 the Church could hardly 
have counted on the same kind of support. We cannot assume that the 
Fourth Lateran Council would have been able to do what the Council of 
Trent just about managed to achieve.
42 ’A (2008) 124–128, with further references.
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Comparison with Islam draws attention to the problem of public opin-
ion. Our next comparison considers the difficulty of draing legislation to 
reform a marriage law, which was descended from, and more or less the 
same as, that of the medieval Church. This case, in eighteenth-century Eng-
land, shows that even if public opinion was not a real problem, it was still 
extremely difficult to frame a law of authentication in such a way as to avoid 
paradoxical results.
In England43 the marriage law of the Catholic Middle Ages survived the 
Henrician and Edwardian Reformations, so that we find it still operating, 
entirely recognizable, in the first half of the eighteenth century. It was only 
finally abolished in 1753 by the Hardwicke marriage act.44 This made mar-
riage by a clergyman necessary for validity,45 with certain other strict con-
ditions attached to give parents and guardians their due. In its intentions, the 
act seems remarkably in tune with the religious and moral values of its time. 
Reading the 1753 Act without the benefit of hindsight, one would think it to 
be watertight. Clause XI, notably, looks like a careful piece of draing:
And it is hereby further enacted, That all Marriages solemnized by Licence, […] 
where either of the Parties, not being a Widower or Widow, shall be under the Age 
of Twenty one Years, which shall be had without the Consent of the Father of such 
of the Parties, so under Age (if then living) first had and obtained, or if dead, of the 
Guardian or Guardians of the Person of the Party so under Age, lawfully appointed, 
or One of them; and in case there shall be no such Guardian or Guardians, then of 
the Mother (if living and unmarried) or if there shall be no Mother living and 
unmarried, then of a Guardian or Guardians of the Person appointed by the Court 
of Chancery, shall be absolutely null and void to all Intents and Purposes what-
soever.46
43 This section owes much to the bibliographical help of Julian Hoppit.
44 For a good overview, see O (1995). Note also the following: L (1996) 
339–360 (arguing that the debates about the bill in the House of Commons lend no 
support to the thesis of a “rise of affective individualism” in the eighteenth century); 
P (2002) 129–151 (arguing that the courts interpreted the Act in a spirit of sub-
stantial rather than formal legal rationality, in that they took a strict line when clandestine 
marriages of minors were in question, while favouring the validity of long-standing mar-
riages); W (2000) 59–82 (analysing the continued role of ecclesiastical courts and 
suggesting that they were sympathetic to the interests of women). For reflections of prac-
tice in literature see J (2001). 
45 O (1995) 84.
46 The 1753 Act [XI], . 176.
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Who could have foretold the trouble to which this clause would lead? The 
passionate attempt to reform the Act by Dr Joseph Phillimore nearly three-
quarters of a century later47 shows how even most carefully framed acts 
could generate paradoxical legal situations. Just like the previous marriage 
law, it was open to abuse, which the courts had little choice but to endorse. 
For it appears to have been easy to give a false age when obtaining a licence. 
If someone pretended to be over 21 when he was not, there was nothing to 
stop him marrying without parental consent. If he subsequently revealed the 
truth about his age, the marriage was automatically void, and he was free to 
marry again.48 Phillimore argues that men and women commonly used this 
rule to get out of a marriage long aer it had taken place.49 He gives 
examples, for instance Wattle v. Hathaway, where:
the woman was a minor at the time of the marriage; the husband obtained the 
license by making oath that she was of age. They cohabited some years, and had issue 
four children; when being in great poverty and distress he went to India, and there 
realised a considerable fortune. He returned to England [col. 1338]; and, aer his 
marriage had subsisted twenty-seven years, instituted a suit for a nullity of the 
marriage, on the ground of his wife having been a minor at the time he had sworn 
her to be of age, and he succeeded in his suit.50
Another kind of problem arose. What was the status of the consent of an 
illegitimate child’s father? It should be remembered that in English law 
marriage did not retroactively legitimize a child: if a child was born out 
of wedlock, it was a bastard even if the couple were joined in matrimony 
shortly aerwards. Courts decided by legal logic that an illegitimate person’s 
father’s consent did not meet the requirements of the Act. Instead, a guard-
ian had to be appointed by the High Court of Chancery.51 Only such a 
guardian could give the requisite consent. Logical this may have been, but 
it could produce a bizarre chain reaction: invalidating one marriage aer 
47 I. 150–153; The Parliamentary Debates, NS, vi, London, 1822, cols. 1326–1362.
48 The Parliamentary Debates, NS, vi, London, 1822, cols. 1333–1334.
49 “those who are acquainted with the proceedings of the courts in which such facts are 
most likely to be developed, will know that I am not indulging in an exaggerated state-
ment, or referring to facts of rare and unfrequent occurrence” (. col. 1334).
50 I. cols. 1337–1338.
51 Phillimore comments that “[…] it was only aer long and elaborate arguments in various 
courts of justice, and aer doubt and hesitation on the part of some of the learned judges, 
before whom this question has been at different times argued, that the point was finally 
determined” (. col. 1340).
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another within the same family without anyone intending it. He gives as an 
example a real case where two minors married with full parental consent, 
without knowing that the man had been born before his parents married. 
The couple had children, one of whom married as a minor with her father’s 
consent. When his own illegitimacy came out, his own marriage was inva-
lidated because his natural father was not entitled to give consent. Conse-
quently furthermore his own consent to his daughter’s marriage was with-
out legal force, so it would be no marriage and her children too would be 
bastards.52
Our second comparandum thus shows that unpredictable cases were likely 
to arise out of any attempt to create a rational law of marriage registration. 
The Hardwicke Marriage Act was passed two centuries aer Trent’s attempt 
to remedy the abuses of clandestine marriage, and presumably with the 
benefit of that vicarious experience.53 The point here is different from the 
Pakistani case. The authority of the Crown in Parliament over the Church of 
England was broadly accepted – unlike the authority of the Pakistani State 
over shariat law. Winning public acceptance of the law’s legitimacy was 
probably not a major problem. In eighteenth-century England, Church 
and State were united quite effectively under one sovereign body. Even so, 
Parliament’s attempt to put a working law in place regarding clandestine 
marriage still opened a can of worms. It would hardly have been different 
with the Fourth Lateran Council, even if it had been sufficiently sure of its 
power over the fundamentals of marriage to take any such step. It is true that 
the illegitimacy paradoxes were less likely to arise in Catholic Canon Law, in 
which bastards were legitimised by subsequent marriage of the parents. Even 
so, the Council of Trent’s reform of the medieval system also led to hard 
cases unforeseen by the Council Fathers.
52 I. cols. 1352–1353.
53 Cf. the comment of Dr Joseph Phillimore (on whom more below), who tried to reform 
the reform: “The terms in which the nullity is denounced are probably borrowed from an 
enactment of nullity, which is to be found in one of the decrees of the council of Trent to 
those marriages which are performed without the intervention of a minister in holy 
orders, and without the presence of two or three witnesses; that is, it defines what cere-
mony shall constitute a marriage; it does not as in the case we are considering, make the 
nullity depend on the conduct of the party who has at once the power of creating it, and 
the power of concealing it.” The Parliamentary Debates, NS, vi, London, 1822, col. 1336.
Authenticating Marriage: The Decree Tametsi in a Comparative Global Perspective 19
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754003
Our third comparandum reinforces the argument of the second: it shows 
how hard it is to frame a law of authentication that really works, while 
satisfying religious requirements. The problems that arose out of the new 
law created by Trent have not yet been adequately studied.54 A few scholars 
have started to trace the effort to make the new decree work “on the 
ground”.55 This effort has been handicapped by the unfamiliarity of the 
scholarly community as a whole, again with some exceptions, with a crucial 
source for studying hitches in the implementation of the new legislation.56
This is the archive of the Congregation of the Council, the curial body 
headed by cardinals which was entrusted with the task of interpreting the 
reform legislation of the Council.57 Some examples from this archive rein-
54 For an important exception, a fascinating discussion of specific cases, from the point of 
view of social honour, see R (1993) (my thanks to Catherine Rider for the refer-
ence) 26–28 (Adriana Savorgnan) and 60–61 (case of Elena Cumano). Elena definitely did 
not match up to Tridentine requirements for validity. Ruggiero claims the same for Adri-
ana, on the grounds that the banns were not read. In fact Adriana may have been validly 
married even under the new law, as interpreted by the cardinals of the Congregation of 
the Council: Novae Declarationes Congregationis S. R. E. Cardinalium ad Decreta Sacros. 
Concil. Tridentini, iisdem Declarationibus conserta, Lyons 1633 [British Library call no. 
1600/181] 340: “Si omittantur denunciationes per hoc Matrimonium non est irritum, si 
fuerunt servata caetera requisita.” This source does not name the date of the decision, so 
perhaps the point had not yet been settled at the time of Adriana’s marriage (1581). An 
anonymous referee of this paper points out other dimensions of the problem that cannot 
be explored here: far-reaching differences of theological opinion about marriage within 
the ecclesiastical milieu, and resistance to the Tridentine rules aer they had been formu-
lated; also that in Catholic (and indeed Anglican) regions efforts to get out of a failed 
marriage via the ecclesiastical courts focused on trying to find flaws in the original mar-
riage contract, given that, if valid, it was indissoluble.
55 A (2005) (I have not seen this but Dottoressa Albani kindly furnished me with her 
abstract); using the statutes of diocesan synods: J (1993) 70–74. (This is a reprint of 
a book published in 1941 (Milan), aiming to explain the canon law of marriage to the lay 
intelligentsia – see the interesting preface by G (1974) 11–22 – so it represents 
the scholarship of two generations ago, but it still retains some value.) R (1953–1954) 
189–207 (he argues on pp. 206–207, summarising an earlier study, that it was far from 
easy to make the new rules work in practice and that the new principles were widely 
ignored or misunderstood).
56 Alert researchers, notable among them S /A / C, are already well 
aware of the riches in this great archive. (Since this essay was draed, Dr C
has published Does the Priest have to Be There?, ed. M (2009) 10–30.
57 P (1897); R (1989) 13–50. Cf. P (1972) 191–223, esp. 198–199 (my im-
pression from this article is that Prodi had not worked on the actual archival fondi of the 
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force the point that it is hard to make registration necessary under a sacred 
law regime; this even with general acceptance of the Council’s power to 
make all future unregistered marriages null.
It would have taken an astute historian to predict from the decree Tametsi
alone the problems to which it would give rise over the centuries. In a 
nineteenth-century compilation of the decisions of the Congregation, pre-
sented in a summary form without the documentation that lay behind them, 
they take up 110 pages.58 These pages are full of human interest. Readers of 
Manzoni’s I promessi sposi may remember that when the parish priest decided 
to delay a wedding (aer being threatened by a local noble who had designs 
on the bride), the impetuous bridegroom tried to trap him unawares into 
witnessing an exchange of vows.59 The Congregation actually had to decide 
whether a valid marriage could emerge from such a scenario, and deter-
mined that the marriage should stand.60
Congregation of the Council). On the fondo containing the archive of this Congregation 
see C (1992) 7–24; B et al. (1998) 21–27, and, especially, S (2006) 
51–79, with an invaluable introduction to the relevant ASV series: 59–60; and now .
(2011). With A, editor of this volume, S was a pioneer of the use of this rich 
body of documentation. See too Vatican Secret Archives Collection Index and Related 
Description and Research Resources, Vatican City 2006, 28. On the neglect of the fondo 
cf. Z, in: P / R (1996) 437–483, at 465 n. 85: “Non mi risulta che la 
giurisprudenza della Sacra Congregazione del concilio riguardo al matrimonio sia stata 
esaminata.” She herself makes use of a three-volume manuscript synopsis of decisions of 
the Congregation of the Council, compiled in the eighteenth century: BUB [Bibliotheca 
Universitaria Bologna] 537: see ., 465–466, 470, 477–478. The archive is, however, one 
of the sources for the thesis of B A (2008–2009), Sposarsi nel Nuovo Mon-
do, notably section II.4.1. John Noonan and his then research assistant Richard Helmholz 
managed to consult the archive before it was deposited in the Vatican Archives, for 
N (1972), Power to Dissolve. R (1953–1954), uses the decisions of the Congre-
gation published by R / S (1853). See now also ’A (2010) Appendix, 
and C (2009).
58 S. P, Collectio Omnium Conclusionum et resolutionum quae in causis propo-
sitis apud Sacram Congregationem Cardinalium S. Concilii Tridentini Interpretum Pro-
dierunt ab eius Institutione anno MDLXIV ad annum MCCCCLX, 13, Rome 1887 [BL 
call number 5018 c. 1], 145–255.
59 M (1960) ch. 8.
60 P (1887) 151, passage beginning: “47. Quapropter proposito dubio: V. Si adsit 
Sacerdos, dum contrahitur Matrimonium, casu non cogitans, se esse ad id vocatum […]” 
and ending: “[…] Valere, etiamsi Parochus aliam ob causam adhibitus sit ad illum actum 
– in Giennen. die 16 Iulii 1582 lib. 3 Decretorum pag. 59 a tergo”. Cf. L (2008) 117.
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Another problem was: did the new rules hold good for France? Tametsi
only applied to regions where the decisions of the Council of Trent had been 
promulgated. The French monarch prevented its formal promulgation in 
France.61 There was a tendency in France for the monarchy and secular 
law to assert control over marriage.62
The seriousness of the problem for contemporaries and its importance for 
historians of modern France can easily be underestimated. True, the French 
monarchy demanded marriage in Church, just like the Council of Trent; 
and it is also true that a priest who ignored the secular rule demanding 
parental consent was taking such a personal risk by defying the regime that 
marriages valid by Tridentine rules which were not also valid according to 
royal jurisprudence were unlikely to occur: that is to say, any marriage in 
front of the parish priest was likely to be a marriage for which parental 
consent had been obtained.
But a crucial point needs to be made here. If Tridentine rules did not 
apply in France, in the eyes of the Church, then marriages by consent alone 
would still be valid so far as Canon Law was concerned. The old medieval rules 
would still apply. The State could hardly prevent such marriages. It was one 
thing to put the frighteners on the parish clergy, and quite another to 
remove all possibility of personal and private exchanges of consent, below 
the radar of officialdom. In the eyes of the Church, however, such clandes-
tine marriages would, if the Council of Trent was not canon law in France, 
invalidate any subsequent marriage in Church, even if it otherwise met all 
the requirements of Church and State. The medieval situation would still 
61 G (1974) at 24. See above, at notes 26–28, for French royal pressure on the 
Council Fathers to make parental consent a sine qua non.
62 Cf. H (1997) 27–52, at 30–31 and n. 12, and H (2003). Not all of the data she 
cites implies a head-on conflict with canon law. Thus Jean Chenu’s views as she describes 
them seem to accept the validity per se of a marriage in accordance with canon law but 
not with French law: the violation of the latter, however, voided it of civil effects – crucial 
of course for property: . 22. Such a situation will be familiar to medievalists: notably, 
in later medieval England a bastard was legitimized by the parents’ subsequent marriage 
in canon law but not in common law. But Hanley also says that French jurists ‘nullified 
marriages in civil courts’ (. 21), and discusses (30–32) the cause célèbre of the Bourbon-
Lorraine case of 1634. Annulment tout court by a secular court, as opposed to nullifica-
tion, so far as civil effects were concerned, was indeed in direct conflict with canon law. 
G (1974), though earlier than Hanley’s articles, is still well worth reading on 
some points: e. g. 22–23 on the 1634 case.
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obtain, with all the power of clandestine marriages to out-trump any later 
ceremony. This consideration rules out the hypothesis with which some 
historians may have been implicitly content, viz. that the Council of Trent’s 
rules did not apply, but that this hardly mattered. For if it really were the case 
that they did not apply, so that clandestine marriages remained theologically 
valid, that would matter a great deal. Banns were read before marriages. If 
clandestine marriages were valid in ecclesiastical eyes, there would have been 
nothing to stop jilted spouses putting a spoke in the wheel of any subse-
quent, and more regular, marriage projects of their partner by telling the 
priest about the clandestine marriage.
Modern scholarship appears to have skirted around this major issue up 
until now. This may be because the Congregation of the Council has 
received too little attention. The decision seems to have been taken by the 
Congregation that Tametsi did apply there.
The key fact is that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the 
Congregation decided that promulgation of the Council of Trent was to 
be presumed in any parish where that decree (Tametsi) had been in fact 
observed as a decree of the Council of Trent – i. e. the parish’s practice 
was the litmus test.63 From then on the decision was available in the Con-
gregation’s archives for reference purposes. Centuries later, when France was 
in the throes of revolution, and many of the parish clergy were compromised 
by their adherence to the “Civil Constitution of the Clergy” (which had been 
condemned by the pope), we find this decision being cited in a letter from 
Rome to the bishop of Luçon, who had written asking what to do.64 The 
bishop had proposed, as a solution to be considered, the line that since it 
could not be established with certainty that the Council of Trent had been 
promulgated in France, its rules were not binding.65 The “select committee” 
63 “Secundo, publicationem praesumi, ubi id decretum fuerit aliquo tempore in parochia 
tanquam decretum Conc. observatum.” ASV, Congr. Concilio, Libri Decret., 10, fol. 47V
(in margin).
64 Epistola ad Episcopum Lucionensem (1793), in a booklet bound into BL Add. MS 8338, 
fols. 114r–119v, at fols. 117v–118v.
65 “Primum animadvertis, non posse certo statui, notissimum Concilii Tridentini Decretum, 
quod legitur Sess. 24 de Reformat. Matrim. Cap. I, publicatum reapse fuisse in singulis 
Galliarum Ecclesiis, quam quidem publicationis formam expresse requirit Tridentinum, 
ut post triginta dies a publicatione facta, incipiat obligare.” (Epistola, in BL Add. MS 8338, 
p. viii, fol. 117v).
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of cardinals given the task of replying to the bishop would have none of his 
ingenious suggestion and referred to, precisely, the Congregation’s archival 
record of its decision, and to its exact date, 26 September 1602.66
There is much research to be done on the reasoning behind such deci-
sions, which seem to have been the result of rational exchanges of opinion. 
An instance may be cited to give an idea of the kind of material to be found 
in the Congregation of the Council fondo. Tametsi had specified that the 
couple should be married by the parish priest. But suppose a family not 
only had a town house but also a pied-à-terre in the country? What if the 
marriage were conducted by the parish priest of their second dwelling? Such 
a case occurred at Florence. The case needs more investigation, but it would 
seem to have been initiated by the woman, who proposed that the marriage 
was null on the grounds that the real parish was the urban one.67 Presum-
66 “Frustra quaestionem modo moveri, num Tridentini Concilii Decretum publicatum in 
singulis Galliarum Ecclesiis fuerit. Cum enim certo certius constet in Ecclesiis Galliarum 
jam usu receptum esse, ut Matrimonia celebrentur coram Parocho, et duobus, vel tribus 
Testibus tamquam in executionem Decreti Concilii Tridentini, hoc profecto satis debet 
esse, ut praesumatur facta ejusdem decreti publicatio, sicut aperte legitur in resolutione 
edita a S. Congregatione Concilio die 26. Septembris Anni 1602., quae refertur Lib. 10. 
Decretorum pag. 47. Publicationem praesumi, ubi id Decretum fuerit aliquo tempore in Paro-
chia tamquam Decretum Concilii observatum; Idemque statutum legitur in alia resolutione 
die 30. Martii Anni 1669” (Epistola, in BL Add. MS 8338, p. ix, fol. 118r). Cf. Z
(1816) 240 n. 84, and (still valuable) F (1865) 502–509. For the whole back-
ground, see G (1974). A pastoral handbook with a Saint-Omer place of publica-
tion, P (1617) [I have used BL 1568/5483: according to the catalogue this is “an 
edition of the work originally entitled ‘Praxis curae pastoralis’”] includes a long list 
(518–556) of the Congregation of the Council’s decisions on marriage, which suggests 
that the Council was deemed to be the law for France.
67 Slash-signs are mine and represent new paragraphs in the document. “Illustrissime et 
Reverendissime Domine. / In causa matrimoniali que vertitur inter Antonium Petri de 
Ugolinis, et Dianoram Iacobi Domini Petri de Victoriis, presupponendum est pro facti 
intelligentia quod Domina Dianora una cum Patre et Avo domicilium habebat et mor-
abatur tempore quo de huiuscemodi asserto matrimonio tractari cepit in domo posita 
Florentiae in Parochia Sanctae Mariae super Arnum, in qua etiam ad presens manet. / In 
qua quidem domo sacramenta semper ministrat Parochus dictae Ecclesiae Sanctae Mariae 
super Arnum. / Item presupponendum est quod Antonius de Ugolinis eodem illo tem-
pore suum habebat domicilium in quo assidue permanebat, in Parochia Ecclesiae Sancti 
Felicis in Platea eiusdem Civitatis in qua una cum omnibus suis sacramenta suscipere 
consuevit. / Hoc stante cum de huiusmodi matrimonio contrahendo tractaretur, licet 
denunciationes debuissent fieri in Parochia utriusque sponsi: / Nihilominus in parochia 
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ably she had changed her mind about the man. The kinds of consideration 
that might affect the judgement are laid out: how oen and for how long 
the family went to their country place; whether they kept the Florence house 
open when they did so, whether the country place was kept in good order 
continuously, where they did their Easter duties of confession and commu-
nion; the implications for many marriages of the precedent that would be set 
by annulling this marriage are noted; it is suggested that the tribunal of the 
Rota be consulted before the Congregation of the Council reaches a decision 
on how the case stands in relation to decrees of the Council of Trent.68
Sancti Felicis pro parte dicti Antonii nullo modo fuerunt factae. / Sed potius in fraudem 
(ut pretenditur) fuerunt ommissae, ne sponsi furor in vicinia notus detegeretur. / Minus-
que fuerunt factae in Parochia dictae Dominae Dianorae, videlicet in Parochia Sanctae 
Mariae super Arnum. / Sed ad instantiam Parochi dictae Ecclesiae Sanctae Mariae fuerunt 
factae in Ecclesia Sanctae Felicitatis, de dicta tamen Parochi admissione, nulla obtenta 
licentia ab ordinario. / Rebus sic se habentibus et sponsus et sponsa ad villam accesserunt, 
uterque tamen ipsorum in sua propria, quae longe etiam ab altera distat. / Aliquibusque 
elapsis diebus, Antonius cum aliquibus suis paucis coniunctis, dictae D. Dianorae villam 
petierunt, in qua fuit pretensum hoc matrimonium de quo agitur in domo privata con-
tractum, quibusdam paucis coniunctis ex utraque parte presentibus, non facta convoca-
tione omnium ut fieri solet. / Ibidemque matrimonio asserto contrahendo presens fuit 
Plebanus Ecclesiae Sanctae Ceciliae ad decimum [?: xmumMS: meaning unclear to me] in 
cuius populo sita est villa Domini Petri de Victoriis nulla habita licentia, neque a Parochis 
d. Sanctae Mariae super Arnum, neque Sancti [fol. 169v] Felicis in Platea, neque etiam ab 
ordinario. / Ex quibus dicta domina Dianora pretendens assertum matrimonium nulliter 
fuisse contractum, nullumque et invalidum esse iudicandum, tanquam contractum ab-
sente Parocho proprio, contra formam traditam a Sacrosancto Concilio Tridentino, petiit 
per infrascriptum libellum ab illustrissimis et Reverendissimis Dominis Cardinalibus Sac-
rosancti Concilii Tridentini Congregationis pretensum matrimonium dissolvi. / Tenor 
vero libelli talis est. / Illustrissimi et Reverendissimi Domini. Presupponitur in facto con-
tractum fuisse quoddam assertum matrimonium, inter Antonium Petri de Ugolinis, et 
Dianoram neptem ex filio Domini Petri de Victoriis, Nobiles Florentinos, sed quia huius-
modi matrimonium non fuit iuxta formam Concilii Tridentini denunciatum, neque in 
Parochia viri, neque etiam in Parochia mulieris, neque etiam contractum coram proprio 
alicuius ipsorum contrahentium Parocho, nulla obtenta licentia, petitur nomine dictae 
Dominae Dianore dissolvi tamquam clandestinum, et contra formam ipsius Concilii at-
tentatum. Huiuscemodi autem libellum, tum de iure, tum de consuetudine iustificatur: 
[…]” [arguments follow] (ASV, Congr. Concilio, Positiones 2, fol. 169r–v).
68 “Dubium est an matrimonium contractum coram presbitero rurali inter cives Florentinos 
habentes urbanum parochum proprium sit nullum, quasi non coram proprio parocho 
celebratum. / Resolutio pendet ex multis in facto consistentibus de quibus non liquet. 
Nam pro nullitate matrimonii supponitur: illos de Victoriis raro, et per xv, aut xx dies 
solitos esse rusticari, eodemque tempore habere etiam Florentiae domum apertam. Pro 
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A letter of enquiry was sent out to the Archbishop of Florence to ascertain 
the facts.69 In the end, the Congregation’s decision seems to have been that 
marriages conducted by the parish priest of country cottages which were not 
a principal residence did not meet the requirements for a valid marriage as 
laid down by Tametsi.70
validitate matrimonii supponitur contra: illos ipsos solitos esse quotannis per duos tresve 
menses in villa commorari, ibique continenter domum instructam tenere prout consue-
verunt etiam alii nobiles Florentini, quorum domos rurales incolunt oeconomi absentibus 
dominis. / 2o Pro nullitate matrimonii supponitur sacramenta paenitentiae et eucharistiae 
tempore Paschatis cives Florentinos non suscipere a parocho rurali nisi de licentia proprii 
urbani, et multo minus matrimonia inter cives per parochos rurales celebrari. Et preterea 
[ptaMS] supponitur Florentiae proprios civium parochos reputari passim urbanos, et non 
rurales, ad quod probandum plures attestationes episcoporum, parochorum, aliorumque 
producuntur. / Pro matrimonio utrumque asseritur in contrarium, probaturque testimo-
niis, et exemplis plurimis rurales presbiteros tamquam proprios parochos ministrare con-
suevisse civibus rus inhabitantibus, predicta, et alia sacramenta, sine licentia urbani 
parochi; nec ullas a 50 retro annis expostulationes, aut querelas urbanorum contra rurales 
exauditas fuisse. / Cum igitur factum unde ius oritur incertum sit, nec constet de con-
suetudine, quae ius interpretatur, vix ulla videtur certa ferri posse sententia, quae cum 
omni maturitate, et discussione ferenda est in causa dubia, et exemplari. Verendum est 
enim ne, si contra matrimonium pronuntietur, patefiat ianua ad impugnanda, et rescin-
denda infinita matrimonia; pro quibus ut respondeatur [fol. 168v] in dubio omnis aequi-
tas, et ratio suggerit. Tractatur etiam de tollenda consuetudine inveterata in quamplurimis 
diaecesibus, et provinciis. / Quamobrem expediret universam huius caussae [sic] cognitio-
nem et discussionem reservare Auditoribus Rotae, qui mature visis atque examinatis [aer 
deletion] iis quae in facto, et iure consistunt, controversiam de iure communi definiant, 
quae definitio numquid obstet Decretis Concilii Tridentini postea poterit videri. Nam in 
presenti non apparet, quae nam interpretatio sacri Concilii expetatur a Congregatione.Et 
sic fuit resolutum.” (ASV, Congr. Concilio, Positiones 2, fol. 168r.)
69 Archiepiscopo Florentino 298. Illustris ac Reverendissime Domine. De hoc libello cum 
actum esset in sacra Congregatione Cardinalium Tridentini Concilii interpretum, ea cen-
suit Amplitudini tuae eum mittendum, ut [fol. 79r] quae in ipso continentur intimari 
curet illi Antonio Petro de Ugolinis, eiusque legitimis procuratoribus, quaeratque ex utra-
que parte quas afferant rationes, praecipue autem super veritate huius facti probationes 
accipiat. An scilicet matrimonium huiusmodi fuerit per verba de praesenti contractum 
coram proprio parocho contrahentium, an vero coram sacerdote, qui nec erat illorum 
proprius parochus, neque licentiam ab Amplitudine tua, eiusve Vicario, aut proprio paro-
cho contrahentium habebat: deinde omnia ad eandem congregationem concilii in scriptis 
referat. Quare Amplitudo tua ita faciet, et in Domino bene valebit. Roma die V Iunii, 
1578” (ASV, Congr. Concilio, Libri. Litter. 3, fols. 78v–79v).
70 P (1887) 13, p. 207, passage beginning “266. Siquidem – Sacra Congregatio, 
inhaerendo declarationibus alias factis […]” and ending “[…] non animo ibi domicilium 
contrahendi – in Urbinaten. Matrimonii die 1 Decembris 1640 lib. 16 Decretorum p. 456.”; cf. 
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All three of our comparanda show how difficult it is to devise a working 
law of marriage registration within a system where marriage also has reli-
gious significance. In a system of purely positive law, that is, where law is 
simply what the Sovereign State calls law and where the legislative sea is 
clear of the rocks and currents of norms and values, rules for authenticating 
marriage become much easier. Even so, the current controversies about gay 
marriage, and the controversies which soon should be expected (in countries 
with large Islamic populations) about polygamous marriage, show that few 
modern legislatures can count on such easy sailing. The modern Pakistani 
State, the eighteenth-century English parliament, and the General Councils 
of the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries all had to work around strong 
religious value systems, and we have seen they did not have it easy. The 
Fourth Lateran Council took the line of least resistence and did not tie 
authentication to validity: the system of banns was fine in principle but 
did not always work because marriages outside these rules were recognized 
as valid. The Pakistani law’s power to bind is contested and its religious status 
full of ambiguity. England continued the medieval system until the eight-
eenth century, then created a new law that produced some egregious para-
doxes quite unintended by the legislators. The Council of Trent’s new law 
threw up a host of problem situations equally unforeseen when the law was 
passed.
That said, the third comparandum stands out in that we find not only a 
host of problems but also a mechanism for dealing with them relatively 
efficaciously. The Pakistani State’s law seems quietly ineffective against the 
authority of a multitude of religious legists. The Hardwicke Marriage Act 
could not be reformed without a further act of Parliament, with all that this 
entailed. The Congregation of the Council, on the other hand, dealt with 
hard cases administratively so to speak, though aer consultation with the-
ologians or lawyers. The Congregation deserves a much more prominent 
place than anyone has given it in the history of Sacred Law. Its workings, 
as we have observed them above, fit very well with a thesis of Max Weber’s 
Z (1816), “Matrimonium § XVII”, 245, passage beginning “26. S. C. inhaerendo 
declarationibus alias factis respondit, Parochum ruralem […]” and ending “[…] coram 
eo celebratum fuisse nullum firmatur: Florentina ibid.” If “ibid.” implies 1640 and is not 
a mistake these would seem to be different cases: a problem to be resolved here. Cf. also 
the discussion – using D L (1673) 115.
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about papal history that gets less attention than his famous and more ques-
tionable argument about Protestantism and capitalism, viz. that:
everything was subject to the control of the central administrative bodies of the 
Curia, and the elaboration of binding ethical social norms could only take place via 
the highly flexible directives of these bodies. In this way a unique relationship 
between sacred and secular law grew up: namely that canon law actually became 
for secular law one of its guides on the path to rationality. And this was a result of 
the rational “institutional” character, of the Catholic Church, with which nothing 
comparable can be found in world history.71
Weber’s reference to the “Central Administrative Bodies” (der zentralen 
Behörden) of the Curia might be an allusion to the system of Congregations 
set up by the Counter-Reformation papacy.72 It is not likely that Weber 
knew much if anything about the workings of the Congregation of the 
Council but he may have been aware that it (and other “Congregations” 
set up during the sixteenth-century reform of the papal curia) made legal 
decisions.73 At any rate his general description fits the developments out-
lined in this essay uncannily well: not least their uniqueness, which a series 
of comparisons has brought into sharp relief. Parayre described the Congre-
gation of the Council as an “Organe originale d’une administration sans 
modèle et sans copie”, adapting itself “avec aisance aux mille besoins d’une 
societé cosmopolite”,74 and the Positiones fondo of the Congregation, which 
scholars are only just beginning to explore, tends to bear out this striking 
claim. Of course, it should not be forgotten that at the level of local tribunals 
there were many inconsistencies between practice and the underlying prin-
ciples of the system, as an eighteenth-century attempt at reform (by Benedict 
XIV) makes clear.75 Nor were his efforts crowned with success, at least in the 
short term. That said, it remains true that at the apex of the system, the 
Congregation took much of the chaos out of the administration of values, 
shared by the medieval and Counter-Reformation Church, which had been 
constantly frustrated by clandestine marriages which it had to recognize.
71 W (1976) ii, 480–481, passage beginning “alles unterstand hier […]” and ending “[…] 
der sonst sich nirgends wiederfindet”.
72 R (1998) 156; P-C H (1998) 100.
73 Cf. W (1976) 181, notes to “480 […] 7 v. o.”, references to works edited by Pietro 
Gasparri.
74 P (1897) xii.
75 P (1966) 399–403.
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We have come to a point where the counterfactual comparative method 
with which we began has transcended the original question about what 
might have happened if clandestine marriages had been invalidated aer 
1215. The original question has indeed been answered. It is fairly clear that 
one way or another a host of problems would have arisen, as they did when 
such a step was taken in modern Pakistan, in eighteenth-century England, 
and at the Council of Trent: most of these problems could hardly have been 
foreseen in detail, even if the Council Fathers of the Lateran sensed them in 
outline. They could hardly have found a neat and clinical solution, though 
things would have been easier if something like the Congregation of the 
Council had been set up three and a half centuries earlier. The Congrega-
tion’s archive is testimony to both the problems generated by the Tridentine 
solution and a mechanism for fixing them.
The original question about the later Middle Ages has thus thrown the 
spotlight on a remarkable post-medieval institution. Almost in passing we 
have been able to provide new data on the Congregation of the Council’s 
decision on whether Tridentine marriage law should be deemed to have 
been promulgated in France, and we have been drawn into post-Tridentine 
intellectual discussions, preparatory to decisions, of a sort that historians 
would give anything to have as background to medieval decretals. Such 
shis in focus should be welcomed in comparative counterfactual history, 
for it may oen happen that a question that preoccupies historians of one 
period gets too little attention from historians of another, and that a com-
parative investigation originally intended primarily to illuminate one society 
ends up advancing our understanding of another society with which it has 
been compared. To make the most of this methodology historians have to 
risk venturing far beyond their personal comfort zones. The pay-off is greater 
dialogue between different sectors of the profession and, oen, unexpected 
discoveries.
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